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The general principle is that it is crucial for the government to provide a stable macroeconomic environment conducive to business development with a clear, transparent and neutral regulatory environment and neutral incentives to all firms and industries. Clear, transparent and neutral incentives (those which do not distinguish by sector or firm) are crucial so that entrepreneurial innovation is rewarded more highly than rent-seeking activities. The economy must provide its most talented members with the incentive to engage in entrepreneurial activities such as starting or expanding firms, developing new products and lowering costs. If the economy provides extensive subsidies or tax exemptions to industries or firms, or presents a difficult regulatory framework within which to do business, corruption will be encouraged and, crucially, talented people will find it more profitable to engage in the socially wasteful activity of lobbying the government for subsidies, protection, tax or regulatory relief. This socially wasteful lobbying is especially harmful because it attracts scarce entrepreneurial talent that would otherwise be devoted to helping the economy grow. First, there is the risk that the wrong industries will be identified. The market is a more reliable indicator of the industries that have comparative advantage than any economic model or theory. Over time this is particularly true, as comparative advantage changes with technological development. Moreover, targeting industries as "winners" will generate rent-seeking where industries will spend resources to obtain government subsidies rather than attempting to compete more effectively on the market. Governments often find it difficult to resist these pressures. And assistance that is designed to be temporary may become permanent. Thus, experience in most countries has shown that a government policy of attempting to "pick winners" is highly counter productive.

"The author has virtually incomparable experience in both providing trade policy advice to more than 25 countries on behalf of the World Bank and also publishing quality journal articles in most of those cases. In this volume, he focuses on his work on: (i) trade policies for countries making the transition from planned to market economies; (ii) his trade policy guideline papers for the World Bank on trade policies for poverty alleviation, uniform tariff policy, adjustment costs of trade liberalization, exchange rate overvaluation, globalization and technology transfer and rules of thumb on regional trade policies; (iii) multilateral, dynamic and environmental issues in trade policy using computable general equilibrium models; (iv) trade policy of the United States in the auto and steel industries; and (v) mathematical methods for modeling. The papers show an unusual combination of policy relevance, advice and impact, with rigor and international trade theory insights. The papers in this volume have appeared in many of the economics profession's more prestigious journals, including Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, the Journal of International Economics, International Economic Review, European Economic Review, Canadian Journal of Economics, Economic Inquiry, the Journal of Comparative Economic, Review of International Economics, World Economy, the Southern Economic Journal, the World Bank Economic Review, the Japanese Economic Review and the Latin American Journal of Economics. In this book, the author elaborates on the articles by discussing some of the policy contexts for the requests for the work from developing and transition countries to the World Bank, the key trade theory or policy insights, policy recommendations and conclusions and the policy impacts."--Publisher's website

Chronicling the highly partisan and polarized environment during the historic first term of President Barack Obama, Congress and the Nation 2009-2012 Volume XIII is the most authoritative reference on congressional law-making and trends during the 111th and 112th Congresses. The newest edition in this award-winning series documents the most fiercely debated issues during this period, including: Stimulus spending in the wake of financial crisis The controversial reform of the U.S. healthcare system Showdowns over raising the national debt ceiling Extensions of tax cuts and unem

Chronicling the highly partisan and polarized environment during the historic first term of President Barak Obama, Congress and the Nation 2009-2012 is the most authoritative reference on congressional law-making and trends during the 111th and 112th Congresses. It covers the shift in partisan control of the U.S. House after the 2010 midterm election and the subsequent gridlock for lawmaking in the 112th Congress, stimulus spending in the wake of the financial crisis, controversial reform of the U.S. healthcare system, showdowns over raising the national debt ceiling, and much more.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the key regulatory, market, and political failures that led to the 2008‐2009 US financial crisis and to suggest appropriate recommendations for reform.Design/methodology/approachThe approach is to examine the underlying incentives that led to the crisis and to provide supporting data to support the hypotheses.FindingsWhile Congress was fixing the savings and loan crisis, it failed to give the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac normal bank supervisory power. This was a political failure as Congress was using government sponsored enterprise (GSE) resources and the resources of narrow constituencies for their own advantage at the expense of the public interest. Second, in the mid‐1990s, to encourage home ownership, the Administration changed enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, effectively requiring banks to use flexible and innovative methods to lower bank mortgage standards to underserved areas. Crucially, this disarmed regulators and the risky mortgage standards then spread to other sectors of the market. Market failure problems ensued as banks, mortgage brokers, securitizers, credit rating agencies, and asset managers were all plagued by problems such as moral hazard or conflicts of interest.Originality/valueThe paper focuses on the political economy reasons for why Congress and US administrations provided these perverse incentives to the GSEs and banks to lower mortgage standards. It also proposes some innovative methods of improving bank regulation that address the regulatory capture problem.

This chapter examines the arguments for and against a uniform tariff structure. Arguments against uniformity are: terms of trade; 'strategic,' infant or restructuring industry considerations, revenue or balance of payments purposes, and tariffs as a negotiating tool at the WTO. Arguments in favor of uniformity are: political economy considerations; administrative convenience; and reduction of smuggling and corruption in customs. The author maintain that tariff uniformity is the best choice in practice. A uniform tariff conveys a number of advantages, the most important of which is that if the tariff is uniform, the gains to industry lobbying are much smaller (and may be negative), creating a kind of free-rider problem for the lobbying industry and dramatically reduces the incentive to lobby for protection. Then: (1) the level of protection is likely to be lower (the recent experience of Chile is a dramatic case in point); (2) there is a direct saving of resources from the reduced lobbying; (3) the reduction to the gains from lobbying for protection provides a vastly improved signal to valuable entrepreneurial talent which will thus be encouraged to create better and cheaper products; and (4) the reduction in resources devoted to lobbying will result in less corruption in government, which may have positive spillover effects into other dimensions of government activity.